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Abstract 
More than 15 years have passed since Myanmar embarked on its transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a bird-eye’s view of industrial changes from the 1990s up to 2005. The industrial 
sector showed a preliminary development in the first half of the 1990s due to an “open 
door” policy and liberalization measures. However, a brief period of growth failed to 
effect any changes in the economic fundamentals. The industrial sector still suffers from 
poor power supplies, limited access to imported raw materials and machinery, 
exchange rate instability, limited credit, and frequent changes of government regulation. 
Public ownership is still high in key infrastructure sectors, and has failed to provide 
sufficient services to private industries. What the government must do first is to get the 
fundamentals right. 
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1. Objectives 
Industrialization is an essential part of overall economic development. Ever since the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, the concept of development and the process of 
industrialization often have been treated as synonymous. Independent Myanmar, like 
other countries, hoped for a transformation of its agrarian economy into a modern 
                                                  
∗ The author thanks Prof. Koichi Fujita of Kyoto University for his encouragement. The 
author is also grateful to the members of the study group entitled “Transition to a 
Market Economy in Myanmar: 15 years of Military Rule” organized by Institute of 
Developing Economies, JETRO, in 2003 and 2004. 
industrial one. Myanmar had long pursued industrialization in the framework of a 
socialist planned economy using State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), which were 
established either by nationalization programs or through new public investments. The 
results after half a century were miserable, with Myanmar being reduced to Least 
Developed Country status in 1987.1 In the following year, the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council or SLORC, which was renamed in 1997 as the State Peace and 
Development Council or SPDC, took power and abandoned the socialist economic 
system, heading toward a so-called market economy instead. More than 15 years have 
passed since Myanmar embarked on this new policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a bird-eye’s view of industrial changes from the 
1990s up to 2005. During this period, on the one hand the industrial sector underwent 
dramatic changes while on the other it showed continuity from the socialist period and 
exhibited evolutionary change. How has the industrial sector changed during the 
transition to a market economy and with the provision of an “open door” policy? How far 
can Myanmar’s industrial development be understood in the context of the country’s 
overall economic development and changes in economic structure? In what ways have 
the government’s industrial and trade polices influenced industrial performances in 
Myanmar? This paper tries to comprehend the mechanism of development and/or 
underdevelopment of industry in Myanmar. Moreover, the author would like to 
investigate the factors that impede industrial development, most of which, he thinks, 
are deeply rooted in structural realities. 
Industrialization can be defined in various ways. The industrial sector usually 
includes manufacturing and mining as well as construction, infrastructure services 
such as transportation, communications and energy, and so forth. While this paper 
focuses mainly on manufacturing, which constitutes a core part of the secondary sector, 
the author also pays due attention to other sectors of the economy.2 The infrastructure 
                                                  
1 For details, see Myat Thein, Economic Development of Myanmar, Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004. 
2  The Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development compiles GDP 
statistics, using a 14-sector classification. In FY 2002, each sector contributed its share 
of total GDP at current producers’ prices as follows: agriculture 48.4%, livestock and 
fishery 5.8%, forestry 0.4%, energy 0.1%, mining 0.3%, processing and manufacturing 
9.2%, electric power 0.1%, construction 3.3%, transport 6.0%, communications 0.3%, 
financial institutions 0.1%, social and administrative services 0.9%, rental and other 
services 1.5% and trade 23.6% (CSO, Statistical Yearbook, 2003). The figures clearly 
show the underdeveloped situation of the industrial sector of Myanmar. In Cambodia, 
for example, the manufacturing sector contributed 20.2% of total GDP in 2002, whereas 
the agriculture sector contributed 35.6%. 
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sector is of particular importance for overall industrial development. 
In the second section, the author provides a history of industrial changes during the 
transitional period between the early 1990s and 2005. The author does not intend, 
however, to confine himself to a mere description of industrial change during the period 
in question. On the contrary, he tries to comprehend the structural transformation of 
the industrial sector in relation to the government’s economic policy. To a large extent, 
government economic policies have both promoted and constrained the industrial 
development of Myanmar. The author divides the period into three, namely preliminary 
development with the growth of pent-up demand, a slow-down during which structural 
problems surfaced, and a shift to a state-factory strategy. 
In the third section, the author adds detail to the industrial history outlined in the 
previous section by means of firm-level survey data.3 Given the paucity of reliable 
statistics in Myanmar, the firm-level observations based on field surveys can enrich 
description and can reinforce the arguments put forward. The survey data also provide 
firm-level observations on the characteristics of private enterprise as well as the 
investment and business climate in Myanmar. 
In the fourth and fifth sections, two sub-sectors are taken as examples. One is the 
infrastructure sector, where state-owned economic enterprises (hereafter SEEs) 
dominate supply and markets. Because of their market power and scale economies with 
immobile investments, public enterprises tend to monopolize the infrastructure sector 
in many countries. However in Myanmar, SEEs in the infrastructure sector have so far 
seriously failed to provide much-needed services to customers, and in particular to 
industrialists. Poor infrastructure delivery at expensive prices has substantially 
hindered Myanmar’s industrial development. The example given later in the paper will 
show the ways in which public ownership hampers industrial development. 
The other sub-sector analyzed here is the garments industry. This is a labor-intensive 
industry, and for many developing economies, it provides the first rung of the ladder 
leading to industrial development. Garment manufacturing in Myanmar registered a 
considerable success up to the imposition of sanctions by the United States in 2003, a 
measure that banned all imports from Myanmar. Garments manufacture provides an 
example of an industry that avoids a bad business environment and disadvantageous 
economic fundamentals by usage of the cutting, making and packing (CMP) system. The 
                                                  
3 For the outline of the survey, see Appendix: Survey on Private Firms in Myanmar 
given at the end of this paper. 
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example shows us a means by which an industry can develop under a poor business 
climate. All in all, these cases will give us food for thought on the role of the government 
in industrial development in Myanmar. 
Lastly, the author summarizes his arguments in a conclusion. Thus far, Myanmar has 
experienced a lengthy period of stunted and warped industrialization with an unstable 
macro-economy and distorted prices. Moreover, the government seems to have reversed 
its strategy of encouraging a market-oriented economy with a vibrant private sector and 
has returned to a planning-oriented one with state-owned enterprises. In addition to 
these developments, the investment climate and the industrial infrastructure are in 
very bad shape. All of these factors seem likely to hinder the industrial development of 
Myanmar for the foreseeable future. 
At this point, a qualification must be made. The author tries to support his arguments 
using some firm-level observations based on a field survey as well as on available 
statistical data. However, he admits that most of his arguments lack robust supporting 
evidence mainly because of the scarcity and unreliability of  statistics in Myanmar. 
Many aspects of his arguments call for further research and study. Nevertheless, it 
hoped that this study will be useful in providing an overall picture of industrial 
development and a frame of reference for understanding the mechanisms whereby 
Myanmar’s industrial development has become stunted and distorted,. 
 
2. Industrial Development under a “Swing Door” Policy 
During the socialist period, the government nationalized all production facilities and 
established new factories whenever they wanted to increase production. The 
government also closed the door to foreign capital except for ODA, which was received 
only after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s. Although the government called this 
policy self-reliant, its attitude was an extremely inward-looking one, and did not really 
lead to the growth of a vibrant industrial sector. On the contrary, it brought about 
import-dependent import-substitution industries, instead of self-reliant ones capable of 
standing on their own feet. Instead of saving scarce foreign currency by replacing 
imports, the inefficient government factories devoured imports in the process of making 
expensive and low quality “Made-in-Myanmar” products. 
Interpreted in a broader perspective, this strategy is based on the traditional and 
rather crude policy of exploiting the agricultural sector.4 While the agricultural sector 
                                                  
4 Koichi Fujita and Ikuko Okamoto, “Chapter 5: Myanmar Agriculture in the Transition 
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generated a trade surplus in the early period after independence, its productivity 
gradually deteriorated and failed to generate a surplus large enough to finance 
state-owned factories. Meanwhile, the influx of ODA supported such industries up to 
the mid-1980s, by which stage it became clear that they would never stand on their feet 
without machinery and raw materials supplied by the donors 5 . When ODA was 
suspended after the coup in 1988, the government had no money to run their factories, 
and they began to turn to the private sector for industrial development instead. 
 
(1) Preliminary Import-Substitution: Pent-up Demand and Competition with Imports 
A series of economic reforms began with trade liberalization, both domestic and 
external. In 1987, one year before the military took power, the government suddenly 
gave up its monopoly over domestic trading in major kinds of agricultural produce. 
Shortly after the coup of 1988, the government allowed private sector businesses to 
engage in external trade and to retain export earnings, and started to legitimize and 
formalize border trade with neighboring countries, hitherto an activity that had been 
deemed illegal. Following this, in November 1988, foreign investment was also 
permitted, by the enactment of Foreign Investment Law (FIL). 
Opening up external trade to private enterprises very greatly increased the number of 
exporters and importers. While about 1000 exporters/importers had registered in FY 
19896, the number increased to about 2700 in the following fiscal year. It reached nearly 
9000 by FY 1997. Thus, traders vigorously entered markets and started up new 
businesses. 
Imported goods poured into the emerging consumer goods markets. The people had 
been cut off from purchasing daily commodities and durable consumer goods during the 
whole 26 years of the socialist period, and once they got access to them, the demand for 
such goods shot up. While consumer goods occupied 6% and 12% of total imports in FY 
1980 and FY 1985 respectively, the corresponding figures shot up to 35% and 42% in FY 
1990 and FY 1995 respectively.7
The release of pent-up demand for consumer goods also opened up opportunities for 
                                                                                                                                                  
to an Open Economy” in Koichi Fujita ed., Myanmar’s Economy in Transition: Market 
versus Control, IDE Research Series, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, 
2005 [forthcoming] (in Japanese). 
5 Kudo, Toshihiro, “Political Basis of Economic Policies under Burmese Socialism”, 
Southeast Asian Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, No. 4, 1998, pp. 161-169. 
6 FY stands for “Fiscal Year” starting in April and ending in March. 
7 CSO, Statistical Yearbook, various numbers. 
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private industries to flourish. It is natural for burgeoning private industries to target 
mainly domestic markets rather than export markets, and consumer goods rather than 
capital goods. The private sector did not have the production facilities, technology, or 
marketing channels for exporting their products and no hope of developing an export 
trade.8 Heavy industries producing capital goods were entirely beyond their reach. 
Of course, Myanmar’s businesses faced competition from imports. Nevertheless, there 
was room for domestic industries to enter into straightforward assembling, mixing and 
processing. Thus for example the so-called “3 in 1” Coffee Mix, a packed mixed powder 
consisting of coffee, cream and sugar, became popular among people after the 
introduction of the open door policy. First, traders imported already mixed and packed 
powders, and then they started very simple processes of mixing and packing using 
imported machines. To begin with, they imported sugar as well, since the quality of 
domestic sugar is not good enough for consumption. They then gradually began to 
purchase domestic sugar, which met the quality standards for instant products.  The 
manufacturers also set up printing businesses so that they did not need to import 
ready-printed plastic packages from abroad. In this way, the local content of “3 in 1” 
Coffee Mix increased, even though coffee and cream powder were still imported. An 
example of a similar trend is bottled drinking water. As late as the early 1990s, bottled 
drinking water was not seen in the streets of Myanmar’s towns and villages at all, 
except for the few international hotels that imported mineral water for their foreign 
guests. By the mid-1990s, however, people could drink domestically purified and bottled 
drinking water anywhere in Myanmar. According to the statistics, in May 2005 there 
were 142 establishments registered at the Ministry of Industry (1) as engaging in the 
water bottling business. 
These products and industries would have never materialized without the release of 
people’s pent-up demand and without the possibility of importing raw materials. 
Although imported goods competed with domestic products, they made the growth of 
import-substitution industries in the private sector possible and feasible. Thus, private 
industries exploiting pent-up demand grew quite rapidly in the early 1990s. 
Manufacturers of consumer goods accounted for about 70% of the 23,675 private 
industries registered at the Ministry of Industry (1) in 1992.9  Of these, naturally 
enough, the majority were rice mills and edible oil mills, which had long existed but had 
                                                  
8 Except for straightforward processing of pulses and beans, and fish and prawns, which 
are agricultural and marine products rather than manufactured ones. 
9 Including food and beverages, clothing, household goods, and printing and publishing. 
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not been registered in the socialist period. However, even among newly established 
businesses, manufacturers of consumer goods appeared at an earlier stage than other 
types of industry.10  
Trade reforms, like any other reforms, can have adverse distributional consequences. 
In particular, some sections of the population may be temporarily thrown into 
unemployment due to imports. Fortunately in Myanmar, there were few private 
industrialists producing such consumer goods at that time. Some state-owned factories 
were manufacturing such things but the potential demand was huge and could never be 
satisfied by production from these factories. Most of the demand for such products was 
filled by a black market reliant on illegal border trades, which were extremely 
inefficient. As a result, there were probably only a few people who lost their jobs due to 
the significant influx of imported goods into Myanmar. On balance, trade liberalization 
had a favorable impact so far as domestic industrialists were concerned. Liberalization 
meant that they were not only exposed to imported goods, which are types of product 
information in themselves, but they were also given access to imported raw materials. 
For the Myanmar industrialist, imported raw materials had an advantage over 
materials obtained through the illegal border trade, which were expensive and subject 
to unreliable delivery.11 All in all, the “open” door policy served as an encouragement for 
Myanmar entrepreneurs to enter the manufacturing sector.12
 
(2) Frustrated Development: the Shortage of Foreign Currency 
New restrictions However, the economic boom and the accompanying euphoria turned 
out to be rather short-lived. In retrospect, the business climate had begun to change 
even before the Asian Financial Crisis of mid-1997. A trigger for policy changes was an 
                                                  
10 Some supportive evidence will be provided by the survey data in the following section. 
11 According to the 2003 survey data, among 149 effective responses, more than 90% of 
firms used foreign-made machinery and equipment to various degrees. Among them, 
about half utilized more than 50% of foreign made machinery and equipment for their 
production. 
12 The government also opened a window to foreign investment by enactment of the FIL 
of 1988, which allowed 100% foreign ownership. The manufacturing sector attracted the 
second largest share of foreign investment (about 20 %), next to the oil and gas sector 
(more than 30%). Most of the investment in the manufacturing sector is in the form of 
import substitution industries producing, for example, iron roof sheets, mosquito coils 
and automobiles, except for garments, which are export-oriented. See Nobuyoshi 
Nishizawa, “Chapter 4: Evolution of External Relations under Military Rule: Focusing 
on Foreign Trade and Investment” in Koichi Fujita ed., Myanmar’s Economy in 
Transition: Market versus Control, IDE Research Series, Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, JETRO, 2005 [forthcoming] (in Japanese). 
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apparent expansion in trade deficits. Once the government liberalized trade, the 
unleashing of pent-up demand meant that imports grew much faster than exports the 
performance of which had been modest at best.13
Foreign exchange reserves became extremely limited in 1997, when capital flows were 
slowing down as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis. During 1997, gross reserve 
coverage had slipped below 1.5 months and coverage of net reserves fell to about one 
month.14 Foreigners faced difficulties in withdrawing foreign currency even from their 
own accounts. When they wished to withdraw US dollars, they had to present 
seat-booked air tickets to prove their intention to travel to foreign countries, where 
Foreign Exchange Certificates, so-called Myanmar dollars issued by the Central Bank 
of Myanmar, are not accepted. 
As foreign exchange reserves dwindled, the government imposed a series of 
restrictions on the exchange and trade system. In retrospect, the establishment of the 
Trade Policy Council (TPC) seems to have marked a turning point. The TPC, an 
extra-ministerial committee, was formed in July 1997, with General Maung Aye, 
Vice-Chairman of the SPDC as Chairman, and with the Minister for National Planning 
and Economic Development as Secretary. The TPC has laid down important policies not 
only on external trade but also on other economic matters. These policies include an 
export-first policy whereby imports are allowed only against export earnings; limits on 
non-essential imports; a 10% export tax; the advanced purchase of beans and pulses for 
export; the advanced purchase of cotton; market-price-based taxation on imported 
vehicles; import restrictions on motor vehicles; a monthly grant for palm oil import; a 
lowered FEC limit on overseas bank transfers; strengthened revenue collection from 
MIC-approved projects; and inspection of under-priced import vehicles. A number of 
these may be aimed at capturing foreign exchange earnings for the government 
budget.15
The new regulations not only slowed down the pace of liberalization but also actually 
reversed the trend toward it. At a time when a second generation of economic reforms 
was needed to address structural rigidities in the macroeconomic framework, in 
                                                  
13 The relatively poor export performance in this period was probably due to delays in 
reforms in the agricultural sector, where major export commodities were still under  
government control with the exception of beans and pulses. 
14  IMF, Myanmar: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report 
No.99/134, November 1999, p. 26. 
15 Kudo, Toshihiro, “Transformation and Structural Changes in the 1990s” in Toshihiro 
Kudo ed., Industrial Development in Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges, ASEDP No. 
60, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, 2001, pp. 40-42. 
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agriculture, in private sector development and in redefining the government’s role, the 
authorities were instead responding to economic difficulties with ad hoc measures that 
were further distorting incentives. 
Slowdown of Private Industries The imposition of new restrictions on the exchange 
and trade system deprived private firms of free access to imported goods, causing a 
slowdown in their economic activity. In this regard, let us consider some government 
statistics. According to the Private Industrial Enterprise Law enacted in November 
1990, any private industrial enterprises using energy of three horsepower and above 
and/or employing ten or more wage-earning workers are required to register themselves 
with the Ministry of Industry (1). Procedures relating to the Private Industrial 
Enterprise Law were prescribed on 1st February 1991. In the Procedures, the relevant 
authorities requested that existing private industrial enterprises should apply for 
registration within 120 days, during which they would be allowed to continue their 
production activities before receiving any directive from the Directorate. 
The number of registered private industries is shown in the Table 2-1, covering the 
period between FY 1990 and May 2005. The number of registrations jumped by 883 
times, from 27 in FY 1990 to 23,848 in FY 1991. The growth in the numbers registered 
stabilized in the following fiscal year, the annual growth being only 5.2%. It can be said 
that almost all the private enterprises that should be registered under the Law and 
Procedures and had the intention to do so, had already registered by the end of FY 1991. 
Thus, increases in the figure of registered industries after FY 1992 can mostly be 
regarded as new entries. 
The first half of the 1990s saw a rapid increase in the number of registered private 
industries. The average annual growth rate in registrations for the period between FY 
1992 and FY 1996 was 8.2%. As previously explained, this growth is the outcome of the 
private sector’s response to the release of pent-up demand. However, for the following 
three years of FY 1997, FY 1998 and FY 1999, the number of registrations stagnated, 
showing an average growth rate of only 0.8%. The figures reflect a slowdown in the 
economic activities of private industries, caused by the newly imposed restrictions and 
regulations on the private sector during this period. The growth to some extent picked 
up in the following years: the annual growth rate for the period between FY 2000 and 
FY 2004 was 3.8%. Strangely enough, FY 2003 registered a quite high growth rate of 
7.1%, an unusually high rate considering that the banking crisis seriously affected the 
whole economy in that year. This figure may reflect other administrative factors, which 
pushed private industrialists to register with the authorities. Be that as it may, the 
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number of registered industrial enterprises declined for the first time in mid- 2005. The 
decline shows, of course, that there were more exits than entries in the previous year. In 
spite of an apparently strong trend towards new entries of private firms into new 
businesses in FY 2003 and FY 2004, some countervailing pressures must have been 
going on, which eventually forced private firms to withdraw. 
Moreover, shortages of electricity and of other infrastructure services became more 
acute during the mid-1990s. The existing infrastructure with its weak capacity was 
soon saturated, and the construction of new capacity could not catch up with the 
generally high growth rate of the economy. Failures in infrastructure development will 
be discussed in detail in the following section. Here, suffice it to say that by the 
mid-1990s, further industrial development was being held back by poor infrastructure 
provision, with private manufacturing being the most badly affected sector.  
 
(3) Shift to a State-owned Factory Strategy 
In Myanmar, State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) have a long history of inefficiency, 
poor management, and vulnerability to all the ills that plague public industry, including 
rent-seeking and corruption. Far from generating revenue for the government, as had 
been hoped, SEEs became a net drain on the treasury. This criticism is here applied to 
the SEEs of the socialist period, not to those of 1990s. Having experienced costly 
failures among public industries, the Myanmar government must have learnt its lesson. 
Nevertheless, the same kind of trials appear to have been repeated around 2000 and 
thereafter. Even though the military government apparently gave up 
import-substitution state-owned factories when they took power, this was not a 
deliberate decision to embark on a strategic shift toward an export-oriented strategy led 
by the private sector, but simply because they could not afford them. When the time 
came and money was available -probably in the form of export revenues from newly 
exploited natural gas- they naturally returned to the original policy. 
Public industrial enterprises did not decrease throughout the transitional period 
toward a market economy; their number increased from 597 establishments in FY 1985 
to 1132 in FY 2002 (Table 2-2). Moreover, the establishment of new public industrial 
enterprises is accelerating: the number of such enterprises increased by only 19 for the 
five years between FY 1985 and FY 1990, by 92 for the next five years between FY 1990 
and FY 1995, and by around 20 to 30 per year up to 2000. Thereafter there was further 
impressive growth, 53 public industrial enterprises being set up in FY 2001 and 231 in 
FY 2002. The timing of this surge in construction suggests that the government 
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launched a massive state-owned factories program in 2000 and 2001. 
This policy change may accord with the government’s drive toward self-sufficiency, 
which appears to have become stronger in 2000 and 2001. From September 2001 to 
January 2002, the New Light of Myanmar, a state-run English newspaper, featured a 
series entitled “Industrial Development”16 This series of articles seemed to indicate the 
government’s way of thinking. Most of the articles described the government’s efforts to 
rehabilitate old state factories and to establish new state-run ones. Very little reference 
was made to private industries, and the investment and business climate were not 
mentioned at all. Moreover, what the authors of the articles appreciated most of all was  
the quantity produced rather than the value of production. Factories’ performances 
were assessed by produced volumes that were measured in tonnes, miles and pieces. By 
contrast, the articles ignored value of production, product quality and consumer 
satisfaction. For example, an article on the textile and garment industry included the 
following: “Thus, the requirement for the entire nation is 187,574 million pounds of 
cotton yarn and 801.6 million yards of cloth. At present, the industries can fulfill 13 
percent of the yarn requirement and nine percent of the cloth requirement of the nation. 
Thus, it is clear that the textile and clothing factories are much needed for the 
nation.”17 Having made this point, the article then went on to explain the new projects 
for constructing state-owned factories. 
Several points need to be raised as regards this article. First, in the calculations 
contained in the article, the production of private industries seems not to be included. 
The private sector is simply left out of the equation. Second, the article shows no 
interest in either what kinds of clothes are needed (for example cotton, wool or synthetic 
materials) or in what preferences consumers might have as regards things like color, 
design, and fashion. Third, the article does not take international trade into account. 
The article considers only the self-sufficient production of specified items. This is 
despite the fact that in the context of a globalized economy, how much a country can 
produce of a certain item depends on international competitiveness and on comparative 
advantage. Fourth, export markets are left entirely beyond the scope of the article, even 
though in most developing economies, textiles and garments manufacturing have 
developed as export-oriented industries. If this series represents the general sentiment 
of the government, their way of thinking is very much quantity- or volume-oriented, and 
                                                  
16 The series consisted of 17 articles starting 17 September 2001 and ending 25 January 
2002. 
17 New Light of Myanmar, Industrial Development-2, September 21, 2001. 
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targets only domestic markets. Such an outlook may be suitable for a planned economy 
operating under a closed-door policy, or even for military logistics, but it is not 
appropriate for a market economy with an open door policy, in which customers’ 
preferences, willingness to pay and international competitiveness all matter. 
Because fiscal data have not been disclosed since FY 1999, we do not know how much 
capital investment has been used for such public industrial projects, and how much 
burden they have incurred on government budgets. Nevertheless, it would be safe to say 
that the government’s push for establishing new public factories reinforced resource 
misallocations by favoring SEEs, which have access to imports at highly overvalued 
exchange rates. 
Moreover, private industries, and in particular agro-based ones, had to compete with 
newly established SEEs for domestic raw materials such as cotton (for which they 
competed with textile mills) and sugarcane (where the competition was with sugar 
mills).18 SEEs can procure raw agricultural produce from farmers by administrative 
orders at prices lower than market prices. They can then sell their final products at 
cheaper prices. Private industries by contrast face two difficulties, namely the 
inaccessibility of imported and domestic goods in the raw materials market, and severe 
and uneven competition with SEEs in products markets. 
 
3. Growth, Stagnation and Features of Private Industries 
This section tries to illustrate the industrial history described in the previous section 
using 2003 survey data. In addition to this, the author provides firm-level observations 
on the characteristics of private enterprises and the investment and business climate in 
Myanmar employing the same survey data. 
 
 (1) Growth and Stagnation 
The survey was conducted between October and December 2003 using designated 
questionnaires. It covered 167 sample firms, 134 of which were located in Yangon and 
33 in Mandalay.19 Among the 167 firms surveyed, 27 already existed in the socialist era, 
before 1988; 41 firms were established during the period 1989-1992; 39 firms were set 
up between 1993 and 1996; 52 firms in 1997-2000 and 8 firms between January 2001 
                                                  
18 For details, see Tin Htut Oo and Toshihiro Kudo eds., Agro-based Industry in 
Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges, ASEDP No.67, Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, JETRO, 2003. 
19 See the attached Appendix. 
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and October 2003 (Table A-1). The apparent slowdown in new entries for the last of 
these periods reflects overall economic stagnation after 2000. However, the figures are 
not necessarily consistent with the number of private enterprises registered with the 
Ministry of Industry (1). The survey data shows relatively active entries for the period 
between 1997 and 2000, whereas the officially registered number shows an obvious 
slowdown as has been described earlier. The differences may be attributed to the small 
sample size of the survey. 
Among 27 survivors from the socialist era, 18 were manufacturers of consumer goods 
such as foods, slippers and traditional medicines. Private firms in this sector constantly 
established new enterprises during the later periods up to 2000. As was discussed above, 
they seem to have swiftly responded to the release of pent-up demand for consumer 
goods. 
Manufacturers of agricultural and marine products also registered a relatively large 
number of entries especially during the first half of the 1990s. Most of them were 
processors of either beans and pulses or fish and prawns, both of which emerged as new 
export items after the adoption of the open door policy. As Fujita and Okamoto have 
pointed out, beans and pulses became major export earners in the 1990s replacing the 
traditional position of rice in the socialist period, due to export-oriented growth of the 
vent-for-surplus type.20 Exports of marine products, which were previously untapped, 
also led to an increase in the number of processors and cold storage businesses. Firms 
belonging to this sector naturally tend to export more than other manufacturers. Out of 
a total 20 cases investigated, some 16 manufacturers of agricultural and marine 
products exported, while only 14 manufacturers of consumer and industrial goods out of 
a total 87 exported (Table A-2). 
Many private construction firms also came into being immediately after the 
introduction of the open door policy. Their growth, also, was encouraged by the 
unleashing of pent-up domestic demand. Potential demand for new (or rehabilitated) 
houses, hotels and office buildings was long suppressed during the socialist period. In 
this sense, construction firms enjoyed the same kind of sudden market improvement as 
did producers of consumer goods, although they were not survivors from the socialist 
period. However, the so-called construction boom was rather short-lived; it petered out 
in 1997 when the Asian financial and economic crisis struck the Myanmar economy. In 
retrospect though, this construction boom was important for the then burgeoning 
                                                  
20 See Koichi Fujita and Ikuko Okamoto, op.cit., 2005 [forthcoming]. 
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private industries in that it gave them a chance to accumulate capital to some extent in 
the early stage of their development. Many of today’s business groups that engage in a 
variety of business lines originated from the construction industry. 
The most recent prominent private industries to emerge were the garment factories. 
Some 10 out of a total of 13 cases of garment firms were established after 1997, mostly 
in the period between 1997 and 2000. This sector will be discussed in greater detail in 
the following section. 
Manufacturers of consumer goods were making traditional products meant for the 
domestic market, whereas producers of agricultural and marine products as well as 
businesses in the garment industry were new types of enterprise directed towards 
export markets. While the processors of agricultural and marine products started their 
businesses in the early 1990s, the garment firms appeared after the mid-1990s. The 
results of the survey seem to illustrate the typical capital accumulation pattern stylized 
by Mieno.21 Private entrepreneurs entered into trading businesses first. They exported 
mainly beans, pulses, prawns and fish, and imported consumer goods or produced them 
for the domestic market themselves using imported materials, and thereby making good 
profits. Many of them entered into construction businesses, too. As native businessmen 
said, the construction industry’s time had come, following a long-term suppression of 
demand. The introduction of a policy welcoming foreign tourists also stimulated the 
demand for better tourist accommodation. Some foreign investors found opportunities 
to invest in hotels and tourism. All in all, the survey figures were consistent with the 
description of the entire industrial history outlined in the previous section. 
 
(2) Entrepreneurs, Management and Business Climate 
Let us now consider some features of private enterprise in Myanmar, as revealed by 
the survey data. The investment and business climate will also be examined. 
Entrepreneurs What are the characteristics of entrepreneurs in Myanmar? First, so 
far as ethnic origins are concerned, the Chinese were far and away more important than 
their minority status in Myanmar might suggest. Among the 167 owners responding to 
the survey, 56 people or 34% were Chinese, while 88 people or 53% were Bamar, the 
                                                  
21 Fumiharu Mieno, “Chapter 1: Characteristics of Capital Accumulation in Myanmar, 
1988-2003” in Koichi Fujita ed., Myanmar’s Economy in Transition: Market versus 
Control, IDE Research Series, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, 2005 
[forthcoming] (in Japanese). 
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largest ethnic group in Myanmar (Table A-3).22 The ratio of Chinese owners engaged in 
manufacturing was even higher than in construction and services, namely 38% for 
manufacturing and 21 % for construction and services respectively. The more active 
participation of the Chinese population in businesses is probably due to better access to 
resources such as finance, technology, markets and information. In particular, access to 
financial resources makes things different, since funds for establishing businesses were 
mainly raised either by self-financing (150 owners out of the 167 firms) or by borrowing 
from families and relatives (47 owners). By contrast, formal financial channels were 
open only for a limited number of business persons. Thus only eight owners borrowed 
from state-owned banks and 22 owners from private banks.23 Chinese owners have a 
longer experience of doing business in Myanmar; some are even survivors from the 
socialist era, having had the opportunity to accumulate enough capital to enable them 
to enter businesses swiftly once the door was opened. Bamar and other indigenous 
people, however, have long been deprived of such chances, having been engaged either 
in agriculture or in the public sector. 
The previous occupation of owners also reinforces the above argument. Among the 
167 owners, 110 or 66% were from the private sector including family businesses. These 
were followed by 23 people or 14% from the public sector including government 
departments and SEEs (Table A-4). Among the 110 owners who came from the private 
sector, there were 43 Chinese people, accounting for nearly 40% of the total. Among 56 
Chinese owners, there were only 4 people who came from the public sector, the share of 
which (7%) is much lower than that of Bamar owners (21%). Chinese people were, in 
general, more experienced in business than the Bamars.  
By contrast with the ethnic distribution of owners, the distribution of managers is 
more proportionate to the ethnic structure of the whole population. Among 125 
managers, 105 or 84% were Bamars, while 14 people or 11% were Chinese (Table A-5).24 
                                                  
22 According to the Population Census of 1983, the latest census ever conducted in 
Myanmar, the Bamar constituted 69% of total population, followed by the Shan (9%) 
and the Karen (6%). One estimate says that there were about 400,000 Chinese and one 
million Indians in Myanmar during the early 1990s, and that Chinese and Indians 
constituted a negligible percentage of total population. However, there are many 
Chinese-blood mixed people in Myanmar. For example, Ne Win was said to have 
Chinese-blood. It depends on the personal perception of one’s ethnic identity whether 
one answers the survey questionnaire as “Chinese”. Here, the term “Chinese” includes 
Chinese people as well as people mixed with Chinese-blood. 
23  Regarding the financial aspect of business establishments and operations, see 
Fumiharu Mieno, op.cit., 2005 [forthcoming]. 
24 Some 42 firms did not have managers, where owners themselves supervised the daily 
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The figures show merely that Bamars can manage day-to-day business operations. 
However, Bamars are handicapped in establishing their own firms in terms of access to 
various resources, in particular finance, and, probably to some extent, they show weak 
entrepreneurial attitudes due to their limited experience and exposure to the business 
world. 
Management and Technology How should we evaluate the management level of 
private firms in Myanmar? The survey asked whether firms separated business 
expenditures from household ones. To have a separate accounting system for business 
can be seen as the first step toward modern management. According to the survey result, 
138 firms out of all 167 cases or 83% of the total had an independent accounting system 
for their businesses (Table A-6). However, smaller firms tend to mix up both types of 
expenditure. As regards smaller firms with less than 20 regular workers, out of 49 
examples, there were 15 firms, or 31%, without a separate accounting system. By 
contrast, amongst the 45 bigger firms employing 100 or more regular workers, only 
three, or 7% of the total, were without a separate accounting system. 
How about book keeping? Of the 167 enterprises covered by the survey, 138, or 83%, 
had been keeping books either on a double entry or single entry basis. They also had 
basic financial statements such as balance sheets (136 firms, or 81%) and profit and loss 
statements (131 firms, or 78%) (Table A-7). However, only a limited number of firms 
kept managerial accounting documents such as an annual sales plan (77 firms, or 46%), 
an annual profit plan (65 firms, or 39%), a financing plan and cash flow (104 firms or 
62%). These figures suggest that their managerial standards may not necessarily be 
sophisticated.  
The survey also asked about production-related aspects such as quality standards, 
cost management and delivery records. Most private firms had such standards and 
records. Out of the 167 cases, there were 150 firms , or 89%, that had their own quality 
standards (Table A-8). Amongst manufacturing firms the share was even higher at 95% 
(114 firms out of 120). Cost management was practiced by 145 firms, or 87% of the total. 
At the same time, however, cost management seemed to vary according to the size of 
firms. Among the 88 firms with less than 50 regular workers, 17 firms, or 19%, did not 
practice cost management(Table A-9). By contrast, among the 79 bigger firms with 50 or 
more regular workers, only five, or 6% of the total, did not practice cost management. 
Private firms had poor data as regards delivery records. Out of the 164 respondents, 
                                                                                                                                                  
operations, too. 
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only 53 firms, or 32%, kept records of incorrect deliveries. 
What was the situation as regards technology development activities? According to 
the results of the survey, 37 firms out of 166 or 22%, engaged in production technology 
development; 8 firms or 5% worked at new product development; 95 firms or 57% did 
both activities, and 26 firms or 16% did not engage in any technology development 
activities. It is difficult to evaluate the level of technology development activities using 
only these figures. However, when we see the data on who was in charge of technology 
development activities, we can understand the nature of most of such activities 
conducted by private firms in Myanmar. About half of the technology development 
activities were done by the founders/owners themselves; about 40% were done by 
members of the company staff; and only about 10% had teams and/or departments 
specializing in technology development (Table A-10). The figures seem to show that 
technology development activities were not systematically organized, and probably were 
not the subject of much investment, whether financial or human. 
Weak Linkages and Localized Markets So far as manufacturers were concerned, the 
survey enquired about modes of production. Among 100 effective cases, 79 firms “design 
their own brand products and make them mostly in-house”, while 17 firms “finish 
products designed by other companies”. The remaining four firms answered in other 
ways. There was no single firm that “processed or produced components for products 
designed by other companies”. Firms produce all their own brands in-house not because 
they are the only manufacturers in the sector, or because such an approach enables 
them to maintain the quality of products and their competitiveness, but because their 
industrial linkages are so weak that they have to produce final products by themselves. 
Among the 167 firms surveyed, only 19 used subcontractors (Table A-11).25 A relatively 
high proportion of the manufacturers producing garments and industrial goods use 
subcontractors. Garment industries need subcontractors to whom they can put extra 
orders placed by buyers in order to meet deadlines, whereas manufacturers of industrial 
goods, and especially makers of machines and processed metal, have more processes 
that require process- and/or skill-specialized subcontractors. 
Another feature of privately-owned industries is that they do not have strong 
relations with SEEs. Among the 167 firms, 121 did not have any relations with SEEs, 
whereas 15 were subcontractors of SEEs, 16 supplied raw materials and parts to SEEs 
and 15 received them from SEEs. Since SEEs have long been dependent on imported 
                                                  
25 On the other hand, 20 firms were producing as subcontractors. 
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machinery and raw materials, they have failed to produce meaningful industrial 
linkages with domestic suppliers, whether other SEEs or privately owned industries. 26
On the whole, industrial linkages are weak not only among private industries but also 
between private industries and SEEs. These figures paint a picture of an undeveloped 
industrial sector, where stand-alone manufacturing firms make their own products with 
limited skill and technology inputs and without transactions with suppliers and 
subcontractors. 
The survey also asked all respondents to give details of their sales methods. Among 
the 167 firms, 69 sold their products directly to consumers, 36 firms sold to wholesalers 
and brokers, and 19 sold to retailers. A total of 29 firms exported their products directly. 
Only 10 firms sold their products to other manufacturers. Even though the author does 
not have data on the sales networks of the firms, it is fairly clear that their products do 
not sell nationwide. On the contrary, the figures portray a picture of fragmented 
markets, where localized markets are not effectively integrated into a nationwide 
market either by physical infrastructure such as roads, railways, telephones, and 
e-mails, or by institutions such as financial systems and standardization of products. 
Private firms sell their products directly to consumers in localized markets only. 
Under such weak industrial linkages and given the prevalence of localized markets, 
private manufacturers  have very little opportunity to produce more sophisticated, 
high technology and high quality products, which require a more advanced division of 
labor and stronger industrial linkages. Selling such products on the nationwide market 
would require sales networks that are more developed, together with better market 
information and better infrastructure. 
Business Climate and Problems The survey enquired about the present situation as 
regards the production and sales of private firms. Among the 167 firms, 90 firms said 
that production and/or sales were “decreasing”, 37 firms reported “increasing” 
production and/or sales, and 40 answered “no change”. The private firms in the survey 
                                                  
26 Given how the nature of work and sub-sectors differ as between private industries 
and SEEs, there should be more transactions to complement each other. According to 
the author’s interviews with Myanmar Agricultural Machinery Industries (MAMI) and 
Myanmar Machine Tool and Electronic Industries (MTEI) both of which lie under the 
jurisdiction of Ministry of Industry (2), several officers-in-charge of production said that 
they would like to employ private-industry subcontractors. They exhibited the 
components and parts that they need to procure at exhibitions in Yangon and Mandalay 
in an attempt to invite potential suppliers. However, they complained of the inferior 
quality of products made by private industries, which did not meet the standards set by 
the SEEs. 
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seem to have suffered from a quite depressed business situation during the period from 
October to December 2003. In February 2003, Myanmar underwent a banking crisis, 
which considerably affected the whole economy.27 In July 2003, the United States 
imposed a ban on imports of products made entirely in Myanmar. This economic 
sanction seriously damaged the garment industry in Myanmar, since the country 
exported nearly half of its production to the United States before sanctions, while 
garments accounted for about 90% of all American imports from Myanmar. Among the 
13 garment firms in the survey, 12 responded that their production/sales were 
“decreasing” the one exception having stated “no change”. 
Although this anomalous development should be taken into account, it would 
nevertheless be safe to say that most of the problems and difficulties that private firms 
faced at that time had existed long before 2003. Table A-12 shows the difficulties and 
problems as expressed by the private firms responding to the survey. Any firms 
encounter problems and difficulties when they run businesses, at any time and in any 
country. Moreover, the alternatives given in the questionnaire are rather arbitrary and 
may to some extent overlap with each other. Nevertheless, the ranking shown in the 
table, the author thinks, reveals a general picture of the investment climate that 
private firms had to operate in at that time. 
“Domestic and local banking” came at the top of the list of problems cited by the firms. 
The banking crisis seriously affected many private firms and the survey results 
certainly reflected this. However, the banking crisis was not the only explanation for the 
placing of this difficulty at the top of the list. As mentioned above, only a few firms had 
access to bank loans. The underdeveloped financial system undoubtedly hindered 
private firms from developing their businesses. “Inadequate infrastructure” came 
second on the list. In Myanmar, private firms and manufacturers in particular often 
point out that it is impossible to operate their factories without electricity. The poor 
state of the infrastructure in Myanmar will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. “Frequent changes of systems and insufficient information disclosure” comes 
third on the list. This problem is related to government rules and regulations. It is 
natural for private firms to complain about rules and regulations: it is understandable 
for them not to like tedious export and import procedures, government inspections of 
                                                  
27 See Koji Kubo, Ryu Fukui and Fumiharu Mieno, “Chapter 3: The Financial Sector in 
the Transition to a Market Economy in Myanmar” in Koichi Fujita ed., Myanmar’s 
Economy in Transition: Market versus Control, IDE Research Series, Chiba: Institute of 
Developing Economies, JETRO, 2005 [forthcoming] (in Japanese). 
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production facilities, and the 10% export tax. However, what they pointed out here is 
something different. In the survey, private firms complained not about the rules and 
regulations themselves, but about the way the government manages such rules and 
regulations and its information disclosure. For example, perhaps unexpectedly, the 10% 
export tax seems not to be thought a particular problem for the private firms in the 
survey, with 148 firms regarding it “not a problem”, in spite of the general impression 
that the tax must represent a serious headache for most businessmen. The figures 
imply that the important factor is predictability rather than the regulation and taxation 
themselves. As long as the export tax continues to be levied at the rate of 10% and the 
enterprise is allowed to use the remaining earnings to purchase imports, private firms 
can include the export tax in their cost calculations and can make managerial decisions 
that take the export tax into account. A lack of consistency, accountability and 
transparency in regulations and in taxation creates an unpredictable investment 
climate, which is a difficult obstacle that hampers private firms from doing business in 
Myanmar.  
 
4. Infrastructure Development: Market Failure vs. Government Failure 
While many developing countries including those undergoing a transition from a 
planned to a market-oriented economy have liberalized the manufacturing sector, they 
often impose greater restrictions on the development of infrastructure. This is because 
the market power associated with scale economies and demand externalities makes 
proper market functions difficult. Even though it has recently become fashionable for 
the private sector to be involved in the provision of infrastructure, public provision 
remains dominant in many developing economies. However, in reality, publicly provided 
infrastructure services have often delivered poor quality and inadequate coverage. 
Myanmar provides a striking example. 
In this section, the author examines the infrastructure sector, in which SEEs 
dominate supplies and markets. SEEs in the infrastructure sector in Myanmar thus far 
have recorded serious failures in providing much-needed services to customers, in 
particular to industrialists. Poor delivery at exorbitant prices has seriously hindered 
the industrial development of the country. The case of Myanmar shows the problematic 
nature of public ownership in industrial development. 
 
(1) Insufficient Investment 
All over the world, firms with access to modern telecommunications services, 
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reliable electricity supply, and efficient transport links stand out from firms without 
them.28 As regards the infrastructure, private firms in Myanmar lack almost everything, 
compared even to poor countries such as Cambodia and the Lao PDR (Table 4-1). 
Private firms in Myanmar themselves recognize the bad influence of poor infrastructure 
on economic activity within the country. The survey indicated that the need to improve 
an inadequate infrastructure is one of the most important items on the agendas of 
Myanmar businessmen. 
It is said that for a long period, the socialist regime did not sufficiently invest in 
infrastructure, leaving a severely handicapped situation for the military government to 
inherit at the start of their drive toward a market economy. It is also said that the 
present government, compared to the previous socialist regime, has exerted every effort 
to build up the infrastructure throughout the 1990s and up to the present. Of course, 
infrastructure development is a long-term task and people should be patient with the 
inconveniences of present work if it means that they can be sure of enjoying the fruits of 
such efforts in the future. Nevertheless, most of the indexes and survey results suggest 
that little if any progress has been made in improving the infrastructure during the last 
15 years. There must be serious faults in either policy or governance for infrastructure 
development to be so poor in Myanmar. 
The allocation of public investment underwent a drastic change in the 1990s, and 
became more balanced and appropriate for a market economy (Table 4-2). 29  An 
increased share of public investment was devoted to infrastructure development 
including public works (construction) and transport and communications. Meanwhile a 
lower share of expenditure was allocated for the productive and services sectors such as 
industry and trade. The share of the industrial sector (manufacturing) fell considerably, 
from 36% in FY1980 to 18% in FY 1985 and 6% in FY 1999. So far as the production 
sector was concerned, spending on agricultural development was given priority. 
Agriculture absorbed 14 % of total public investment in FY 1999. Although the author 
does not know the detailed budget allocation within the agricultural sector, the 
emphasis seems to have been on infrastructure development, including the construction 
of dams, reservoirs and new irrigation systems. This is a significant departure from the 
                                                  
28 World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for 
Everyone, 2005, p.124. 
29 The fiscal data of the Myanmar government, including SEEs, is available only up to 
FY 1999, even in the latest issue of Statistical Yearbook, 2003. 
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past public policy of investing heavily in publicly owned industry.30
Nevertheless, the figures of this table do not reveal the real significance of capital 
investment in the infrastructure sector. Here, the author calculated per thousand (‰) of 
capital investment of SEEs as of nominal GDP, a method that can capture the real 
economic value of investment. 
It is rather surprising to see that the figures given in Table 4-3 declined in the 1990s. 
Although the government proudly claimed it had spent heavily on infrastructure 
development since their seizure of power, in actual terms spending declined. The 
government invested far less in infrastructure development in the 1990s than in FY 
1985. No single infrastructure sector received more capital investment in the 1990s 
than in FY 1985 or in FY 1990. The figures contrast with the generally held impression 
that the SLORC/SPDC government emphasized infrastructure development much more 
than the previous socialist regime. The government has constructed many roads, 
bridges, dams, power plants, new airports and so forth.31 However, in reality, they have 
failed to mobilize sufficient resources for constructing infrastructures in line with 
overall economic growth (GDP).32
Due to poor investment in the 1990s, infrastructure facilities and services have not 
shown any improvement. Table 4-4 shows that infrastructure capacity and/or services 
have even declined in some sectors during the 1990s. For example, the air freight total 
for FY 2002 was only 60% of that of FY 1990, while passengers by road in FY 2002 were 
only 40% of those in FY 1990.33 In most respects, the provision of infrastructure failed 
to grow in proportion to GDP growth. The figures indicate the worsening, or at best 
stagnation, of infrastructure supply capacity. Were the government to have invited 
                                                  
30 Prof. Myat Thein also appraised a more-balanced public allocation by SLORC/SPDC 
government, stating “The new emphasis given to infrastructure development, and 
especially transport, also seems to be in accord with the market-oriented policy. The 
large proportion of public investment in the social sector, however, was taken up largely 
by defence.” (Myat Thein, Economic Development in Myanmar, 2004, p.133) As Prof. 
Myat Thein pointed out, “defence” increased its share from 6% in FY 1985 to 32% in FY 
1995. Such an allocation shall not be regarded as balanced. Here, the author confines 
his argument into productive sectors and infrastructure sectors only. 
31 See Magnificent Myanmar (1988–2003), Yangon: Ministry of Information, 2003. 
32 In retrospect, the author doubts whether the more balanced allocation of public 
investment in the 1990s happened to result solely from the sudden suspension of ODA, 
which had previously been poured into state-owned economic enterprises in the 
industrial sector. He believes that the apparently renewed allocation policy was not 
created by a firmly resolute change of public investment policy in accord with a drive 
toward a market economy. 
33 Note that the figures may not include private services. For example, some private 
airline services and many private bus services started their operations in the 1990s.  
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private sector participation, the infrastructure situation in Myanmar would have been 
quite different. 
 
(2) Inefficient Management 
Shortage of public investment capital was not the only reason for lackluster 
infrastructure development in the 1990s. The inefficient management of SEEs in the 
infrastructure sector also hampered growth. Most SEEs simply failed to run their daily 
businesses in a proper manner. 
Apart from capital investment, SEEs in the infrastructure sectors lost money in 
their day-to-day operations. As shown in Table 4-5, most of them could not even cover 
their operational costs using their own revenues. Moreover, the deficits increased 
considerably in FY 1997 and FY 1998. For example, MEPE, which had recorded a 
surplus ever since FY 1980, suddenly plunged into the red in FY 1998 and FY 1999. 
Enterprises running various modes of transport followed the same pattern. The five 
SEEs engaged in waterways and airways went into the red in FY 1997 and FY 1999; 
Myanmar Railways was in deficit in FY 1998 and FY 1999 after having made a 
comfortable surplus for many years; and Road Transport suffered losses in FY 1996 and 
FY 1997. The telecommunications, posts and telegraph sector was an exception and 
enjoyed a relatively substantial surplus up to FY 1999. 
What are the factors contributing to the deterioration of the SEEs’ operations? Two 
issues need to be discussed: one is inefficient management of the SEEs and the other is 
rent-seeking activities, both of which are presumably caused by lack of competition and 
abuses of monopolistic market power. 
SEEs are strictly controlled by the respective ministries, or in other words by the 
government. Since 1989, the budget of all SEEs has been consolidated into the State 
Fund Account (SFA), a practice that has deprived SEEs of financial independence. 
When SEEs lose money, they receive subsidies by way of compensation. When they 
make profits, they hand them over to the SFA. They have no financial incentive to 
increase revenue and reduce costs. The management of SEEs is also highly centralized 
and moreover they lack managerial independence. The government instructs how much 
SEEs should invest in which year, how much they produce in terms of products and 
services, at what prices they sell their products and services, and so forth. In other 
words, SEEs are merely part of the government. 
Most tariff rates charged by the public utilities owned by SEEs tend to be 
suppressed below market prices leaving a surplus demand that is prey to rent-seeking 
  25
activities. In addition to imposing lower price settings, the SEEs often favor particular 
groups such as other SEEs, military units and related enterprises, and governmental 
officials, and these clients tend to be charged cheaper tariff rates. Revisions of tariff 
rates have often lagged behind the rapid devaluation of the Kyat, whereas most inputs 
for producing such services have been dependent on imports, including foreign exchange 
costs such as fuel and imported spare parts. This seems to have contributed towards the 
serious deterioration of the SEEs’ financial situation. 
 
(3) SEEs in Electricity, Communications and Petroleum 
This section examines three key SEEs in electricity, communications and petroleum 
distribution respectively. These cases highlight the difficulties surrounding the public 
provision of infrastructure services. 
MEPE Electric power supply in Myanmar is monopolized by Myanmar Electric 
Power Enterprise (MEPE), a SEE that comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Electric Power. The State-owned Economic Enterprises Law of 1989 stipulated that 
electric power generation shall be exclusively done by public enterprises. MEPE is the 
sole provider of electricity generation and transmission nationwide. 
The total installed capacity of electric power was 1335 MW as of September, 2004,34 
increases in capacity having lagged behind overall GDP growth, as was mentioned 
earlier. The per capita consumption of electric power is 108 kw, which is one of the 
lowest in the world. Only 5% of the people of Myanmar have access to electricity, a much 
lower percentage than in Cambodia (17%) and the Lao PDR (41%). Demand for electric 
power tends to increase more rapidly than GDP in any economy during the early stages 
of economic development and this is true also of Myanmar. To make matters worse, it is 
said that in FY 2001, around 15% of electricity was lost during generation, transmission 
and distribution, making the demand-supply gap even wider. The EIU has estimated a 
220 MW shortfall in electricity supply in Myanmar in recent years.35
Because the supply of electricity is unreliable and insufficient, industrial firms 
depend on their own or shared generators, which are run on diesel. The market price of 
diesel is expensive and the technical efficiency of electricity generation by small-scale 
generators is low. As a result, independently generated electricity is costly compared to 
power supplied through the grid. Moreover, the tariff rates are multi-tiered and 
                                                  
34 Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, CSO, September 2004. 
35 EIU, Country Profile 2004 Myanmar (Burma), 2004, p. 20. 
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foreigners, whether residents or organizations, must pay in US dollars or FEC, which 
makes real charges for electricity much more expensive than local ones. A foreign 
garment factory located in Mingalardone Industrial Estate, one of the best industrial 
parks in Myanmar, experienced frequent and lengthy electricity outages and had no 
alternative but to use its own generator. In 2004, the firm’s energy costs, including 
electricity from the grid and diesel oil, was 1.4 times more than its labor costs.36 Even in 
the highly labor-intensive garment industry, energy costs more than labor. Thus it is 
that cheap labor costs have been offset by expensive infrastructure services. 
MPTE Myanmar Post and Telecommunication Enterprise (MPTE), a corporation 
that comes under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs, 
has long enjoyed a monopoly in the provision of telephone services. Their services are 
notorious for frequent disconnections, lengthy waiting times for connections, and 
costliness. Customers have to wait for a long time until they get connected to lines and 
they are often asked for “tea money” in return for making connections. As a result of 
inadequate coverage and unreliable services, the market rates for telephone lines vary 
considerably from telephone number to telephone number. Customers try to get better 
lines by offering, again, “tea money” to MPTE officials. International phone calls are 
grossly expensive; for example it costs 4.5 US dollars per minute for a telephone call 
from Myanmar to Japan. 
Mobile phones are few and far between and are for privileged customers only. Mobile 
phones are sometimes sold to specially designated groups such as military cadres, high 
ranking government officials and so-called crony businessmen. Some mobile phones are 
resold to real customers who have a pressing need for telephone services and can afford 
extravagant market prices. 
As regards Internet provider services, the government allowed one private company 
to enter the market. This company, however, was run by a son of then Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt. This move seems to have improved the Internet environment in 
Myanmar. Nonetheless, Internet accessibility lags far behind access in neighboring 
countries, where liberalization has gone much farther. The Internet café is a recent 
phenomenon found only in Yangon and Internet access through personal computers at 
home is something far beyond the wildest dreams of the majority of the population. 
Even the issuance of e-mail accounts is quite limited. 
MPPE The Myanmar Petroleum Products Enterprise (MPPE) is the sole enterprise 
                                                  
36 Personal communication from the factory manager in June, 2005.  
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responsible for the distribution and sale of petroleum products in Myanmar. MPPE has 
four main fuel terminals, 26 sub-fuel terminals, 11 aviation depots and 256 filling 
stations nationwide.37 MPPE presents a typical case of an enterprise falling prey to 
rent-seeking activities. In June 2005, their petrol stations were selling gasoline and 
diesel at the official rates of 180 kyats/gallon and 160 kyats/gallon respectively, whereas 
the free market rates of these two fuels were approximately 2000 kyats/gallon and 2300 
kyats/gallon respectively.38 Such pricing naturally creates gross shortages at official 
prices, giving MPPE arbitrary power of allocation. In principle, car owners in Yangon 
are entitled to two gallons per car per day. However, some privileged groups such as 
government officials, other SEEs, and military units are allowed extra allocations. All 
these surplus allocations are resold on the parallel market, providing windfall money to 
the sellers. The fuel is then distributed to actual consumers by “black” merchants, who 
although operating beyond the law, are openly present, buying and selling fuel just next 
to the filling stations that have supplied them. 
Such pricing policies have made MPPE one of the biggest loss making SEEs in 
Myanmar. MPPE’s losses in current cash budget terms accounted for about 10% of the 
total losses of SEEs in FY 1997 and FY 1998. Imports of refined mineral oil have been 
increasing as demand has expanded, and grew by about nine times between FY 1990 
and FY 2003. The share of refined mineral oil in total imports also increased, from less 
than 5% in the mid-1990s to 13% in FY 2003. This import trend suggests that MPPE’s 
present deficit is growing, and is likely to continue to increase in the future unless price 
liberalization occurs. Moreover, MPPE’s supply of subsidized fuel deters other SEEs and 
privileged groups from introducing managerial and structural reforms, resulting in 
more distorted resource allocations. 
Conclusion The author does not know whether or not the trends described above 
have continued since FY 1999. However, so far there has been no indication of 
substantial SEE reforms of an institutional, organizational or managerial nature. Poor 
management and rent-seeking activities seem to be continuing at the present time. 
Budgetary difficulties have constrained capital investment in the infrastructure, 
with the result that the provision of infrastructure services has lagged far behind the 
expansion of the economy as a whole. Inefficient management has also contributed to 
the failure of the infrastructure SEEs to deliver good services to customers. Public 
                                                  
37  The energy sector of Myanmar government homepage is available at 
http://www.energy.gov.mm/.  
38 Personal interviews with taxi drivers in Yangon in June 2005. 
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ownership as well as government restrictions on private sector participation have 
entirely excluded competition from this sector. Conventional wisdom warns, for example, 
that outright privatization may not function in infrastructure provision because of 
market failures. However, in reality, government failures seem to have made matters 
much worse. In a sense, the infrastructure sector more than any other has been the 
worst victim of strong intervention by the government, an intervention that has brought 
about many government failures. 
It follows that a better investment and business climate for infrastructure 
development is desperately needed, to invite potential private investors. Otherwise, the 
cash-starved government will never be able to invest enough in infrastructure, and the 
scarce resources invested in the sector will continue to be wasted with all the drawbacks 
attendant on government intervention. 
 
5. The Garment Industry: A Successful CMP-based “Enclave” 
An exceptionally brisk development of the garment industry was apparent in the 
late 1990s and around 2000, although the American sanctions of July 2003 caused 
considerable damage thereafter. This section tries to investigate how this industry 
overcame, or avoided, the poor investment climate and the disadvantageous economic 
fundamentals of Myanmar. The case will suggest that there is a way forward that 
Myanmar industrialists might explore under such constraints; at the same time the 
case highlights the tasks both entrepreneurs and the government will have to tackle if 
they wish to develop this industry further. 
 
(1) Brief History 
The manufacture of garments for export is a relatively recent industry in Myanmar. 
First, state-owned and military-related textile and garment factories started production 
for overseas buyers and customers in the early 1990s. Then, some foreign firms, and 
especially companies from Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, established joint ventures 
with these factories, while some established wholly-owned factories funded entirely by 
foreign capital. “Boom” conditions in the garment industry of Myanmar came about only 
in the late 1990s. In short, garment manufacture is still quite a young industry in 
Myanmar. 
The export value, or production value, increased rapidly in the late 1990s in 
response to strong demand from the United States and the countries of the European 
Union. Table 5-1 shows the main countries importing Myanmar-made clothes, and it 
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can be seen that there is a big discrepancy between export data on the Myanmar side 
and import data on the recipients’ side. Of course, the two sets of data employ different 
trade terms such as FOB or CIF and time records differ according to transportation 
time, and so forth. Nevertheless, the gap between the two is unreasonably wide. For 
example, the export data of the Myanmar customs recorded the value of garment 
exports as 225.8 million USD in 2004, whereas the data given by the importing 
countries for garment imports from Myanmar came to a total of 547.3 million USD, 
more than twice that of the export data. Such discrepancies seem to be caused by 
several factors. First, Myanmar exporters understate the value of their exports so as to 
avoid the 10% export tax. Second, they may use different exchange rates in arriving at 
the export value given in USD. Third, re-labeling practices may well be being used to 
conceal the fact that the exported garments originate from Myanmar. Some buyers may 
not like the statement “Made-in-Myanmar” for human rights reasons and because of the 
highly unfavorable political image of the military dictatorship. It is said that some 
industrialists re-label the products in another country. In any case, however, garment 
exports increased rapidly only the late 1990s, reaching a peak of 829 million USD in 
2001. 
The American sanctions of July 2003 severely damaged the garment industry of 
Myanmar. The Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association has tried to estimate the 
impacts. It claims that the number of factories fell from 400 factories to 180, and the 
number of workers from 300,000 to 120,000. Sanctions also caused CMP charges to 
decline by about half. Without any doubt, American sanctions devastated this industry. 
 
(2) CMP-based “Enclave” 
Why did the garments industry show such a rapid growth before the imposition of 
the American sanctions? There are of course various factors such as labor costs, the 
MFA quota, and the “China+1” diversification strategy of buyers. All of these factors 
contributed substantially to the growth of the garment industry in Myanmar.39 At the 
same time, all of these factors continuously pose challenges to the garment industry, 
and determine its destiny in line with market demand, international competitiveness, 
capital formation, human resources, technology transfer, and so on. Here, however, the 
                                                  
39 See, for example, Moe Kyaw, “Chapter 4: Textile and Garment Industry: Emerging 
Export Industry” in Toshihiro Kudo ed., Industrial Development in Myanmar: Prospects 
and Challenges, ASEDP No. 60: Chiba, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, 
2001, pp.143-173. 
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author prefers to focus on the system that made possible the development of this 
industry despite a poor investment climate and the weakness of the economic 
fundamentals described earlier, assuming the above-mentioned factors as given or 
exogenous. By understanding the institutional set-up that supported the growth of the 
garment industry in Myanmar, we can better understand the structural problems 
impeding the development of other industrial sectors. Moreover, such an approach 
enables us to better understand the prospects and challenges that the garment industry 
itself will face in the near future, once firms set out to climb up the industrial ladder 
toward more skill-intensive and sophisticated products. 
How did the garment industry overcome multiple exchange rates, control of import 
licenses, lack of raw materials and finance and all the other handicaps presented by the 
investment climate of Myanmar? It did so by the usage of Cutting, Making and Packing 
(CMP) arrangements, in which overseas buyers do everything but production. Thus 
under this system, overseas buyers find customers, design the clothes with detailed 
specifications, and procure raw materials, leaving the Myanmar industrialists to 
construct factories equipped with sewing and broidering machines, to employ workers 
and to sew clothes. By contrast, the so-called “FOB” production modality involves more 
active participation of Myanmar industrialists in matters such as procurement of raw 
materials, design of clothes and marketing.40 The latter modality requires the economy 
and its industrialists to have better-developed upstream industries, stronger industrial 
linkages, better access to financial facilities, more business coordination ability and 
more risk-taking attitudes, most of which are currently not available in Myanmar. 
Garment manufacture is a labor intensive and export-oriented industry and one 
that has swiftly shifted its production bases from one county to another, in search of 
ever cheaper labor costs and ever more attractive quotas.41  The industry utilizes 
                                                  
40  Based on his survey of Vietnamese firms, Goto classified the so-called “FOB” 
contractual arrangements into three types. The first type is where Vietnamese firms 
purchase input materials for processing from suppliers that are designated by foreign 
buyers (FOB Type I). The second type is where Vietnamese firms receive garment 
samples from foreign buyers (FOB Type II). The third type is where the Vietnamese 
firms initiate production of garments based on their own design, with no prior 
commitment of any kind from foreign buyers (FOB Type III). (Kenta Goto, 
“Coordinating Risks and Creating Value: The Challenges for the Vietnam Textile and 
Garment Industry”, NEU-JICA Discussion Paper No.5., 2002), available at 
www.grips.ac.jp/module/vietnam/garment_en.html. The term “FOB” here has no 
relationship with the one defined under Incoterms. 
41 Under the MFA (Multi-Fiber Arrangement), the US and the EU had long imposed 
quantitative limitations on importable amounts specific to each exporting country. 
Myanmar enjoyed a free quota on the EU market and quotas were imposed by US with 
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conventional technology and its initial investments, mainly sewing machines, are 
relatively small. Raw materials are not that heavy and bulky, and they are 
transportable at reasonable cost. The nature of the product makes CMP arrangements 
possible in the garment industry. In other words, the CMP system can create enclaves 
where all raw materials are provided from abroad and products are processed by 
domestic workers and exported again to overseas markets, avoiding messy domestic and 
international transactions and settlements. 
CMP arrangements are of course applicable to other industrial sub-sectors and are 
already present in industries such as shoes, electronics, and medical and optical 
appliances. However, the arrangements in these industries are few and far between and 
show limited success, probably because they demand a larger initial investment, more 
highly trained workers, and a more reliable infrastructure. Given the present 
investment climate and industrial fundamentals in Myanmar, CMP arrangements 
could create enclaves only in relatively straightforward lines of production such as 
garment manufacture. 
The most important advantage of CMP arrangements is that Myanmar 
industrialists do not need to pay for imported raw materials such as fabrics and buttons. 
Instead, almost all raw materials except small things like carton boxes and plastic bags, 
which are domestically procurable, are provided by overseas buyers with their own 
financing and risks. The actual payment is merely the remittance of processing fees to 
MFTB and/or MICB, two state-owned foreign exchange banks, by overseas buyers after 
their receipt of products. Myanmar industrialists do not have to be bothered by all the 
controls surrounding importing and exporting or by tedious procedures as in other 
sectors. 
So far as can be ascertained, there is no “FOB” modality of production in Myanmar, 
whereas it is said that between 10 to 15 % of garment factories in Vietnam are engaged 
in “FOB”-type production and export. Although Goto asserts in the aforementioned 
paper that a shift from CMT (CMP)42 to FOB does not necessarily guarantee increased 
value-added and international competitiveness, the viability and feasibility of “FOB” 
operations are closely related to better investment and to a more favorable business 
climate, in which indigenous industrialists can take more risks. The de facto 
impossibility of “FOB”-type production and export in Myanmar implies a poor 
                                                                                                                                                  
respect to only six items. The MFA was abolished on 1st January, 2005. 
42 CMT(Cutting, Making and Trimming) is the more common term for what is CMP in in 
Myanmar. 
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investment and business environment. 
 
(3) Regulation and Taxation on CMP Businesses 
Import Controls The government nevertheless started to regulate and restrict 
CMP-based businesses, when they had become popular and when the shortage of 
foreign exchange became acute in 1997 and 1998. It seems that there were some 
fraudulent cases, and these, too, triggered stricter government controls. The Ministry of 
Commerce issued a directive stating that as from December 9, 1997, only materials such 
as textiles, cloth, woolen cloth and leather necessary for the production of garments 
would be allowed to be imported under CMP arrangements.43 Since the government 
regarded CMP-based businesses as a kind of services industry earning service fees 
(processing charges in reality), traders with nothing but import/export licenses were 
also engaging in the CMP business.44 These traders sometimes tried to import goods 
other than raw materials for garment production under CMP-based arrangements. 
Similar misconduct can be found anywhere among the developing economies, but this 
case also shows the strength of the demand for imported goods in Myanmar. Imported 
goods, non-essential luxury ones in particular, sold well, and businesses that dealt in 
them made big profits. Businessmen often said “they export in order to import”. Even if 
businessmen lost money in exporting, they could make profits by importing, using their 
export earnings to buy the imports. Therefore, it is natural that traders tried to take 
advantage of CMP arrangements to import lucrative goods. The government issued a 
directive to confirm and enforce the previous one on April 27, 1998.45 The government 
went on to further tighten import controls even on investments approved under the FIL 
(Foreign Investment Law) and MCIL (Myanmar Citizens Investment Law) through the 
authority of the MIC (Myanmar Investment Commission), requiring businesses to apply 
for import licenses that were previously not necessary.46
                                                  
43 Directorate of Trade, Ministry of Commerce, News Letter 14/97 dated on December 9, 
1997. 
44 Foreign currencies earned by CMP-based businesses are not regarded as “export 
earnings” the holders of which are entitled to import (Export First Policy). This is 
because they are regarded as service fees rather than exports as defined by the 
government. 
45 Directorate of Trade, Ministry of Commerce, News Letter 2/98 dated on April 27, 
1998. 
46 This change of rules seems to have considerably affected the garment industries, in 
particular those that needed QR (Quick Responses). According to an owner of a foreign 
garment factory in Yangon, the delay in imports delivery due to the application for 
import licenses critically damaged its just-in-time production and caused him 
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Tax In matters of taxation, the government went beyond existing regulations and 
restrictions. It tried to tax CMP-based businesses and extract part of their foreign 
earnings. With effect from May 2001, CMP-based businesses had to make their kyat 
conversion at the semi-official rate of 450 Kyat per 1 USD at the Foreign Exchange 
Certificate Centre located downtown, while the market rate was at the time around 700 
Kyat/USD. The government tried to enforce all CMP-based businesses to change their 
foreign revenues at the rate of 450 Kyat/USD. However, subsequently, the government 
relaxed the requirement to make it applicable for the wage portion only. Be that as it 
may, this is a form of implicit tax levied on CMP-based businesses. 
 The government went on to impose the so-called 10% export tax on all the revenues 
of CMP-based businesses made after October 2003. The export tax was introduced in 
1999 and is said to have consisted of 8% commercial tax and 2% income tax. In practice, 
however, 10% is automatically levied on all exports regardless, presumably, of different 
profit ratios. CMP-based businesses were previously exempted from the 8% commercial 
tax, leaving them to pay only the 2% income tax levied on all foreign revenues.47 At the 
same time, the compulsory exchange at the below-the-market rate of 450 Kyat/USD was 
abolished. It is unclear whether this change favored CMP-based businesses or not, since 
the effective tax burden depends on the cost structure of each establishment as well as 
on market exchange rates. It is however clear that this was not exactly an encouraging 
policy initiative for the garment industry, coming as it did immediately after the 
devastating impact of the American sanctions. 
Moreover, CMP-based businesses face another difficulty in that it is not easy for 
them under government regulations to import goods other than raw materials directly 
used for production. The garment factories need machines and tools, spare parts, and 
sometimes automobiles for the use of administrative staff. Automobiles are the last 
thing that the government will permit them to import. The government, being far too 
cautious about the possible illegal sales of such luxuries has in effect banned 
everything. 
Conclusion The garment industry has grown by using CMP arrangements, which 
created enclaves in the midst of a poor investment climate and disadvantageous 
industrial fundamentals. However, garment makers have not been able to operate free 
                                                                                                                                                  
eventually to decide to withdraw from Myanmar in 1999 (Personal communication). 
47 As mentioned before, however, foreign revenues from CMP-based businesses are not 
regarded as “export earnings”, which are entitled to import. With the 10% export tax 
applicable to them, CMP revenues have also become fully-fledged “export earnings”. 
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of government regulation. The government has often tried to regulate and control them, 
and squeeze foreign exchange from them. The CMP-based enclaves could not operate in 
physical isolation from the poor infrastructure, either. (The weak state of the Myanmar 
infrastructure has been explained in the previous section.) 
When the garment industry in Myanmar wishes to increase its productivity, it 
inevitably proceeds to procure more domestic raw materials for garment production. 
With enhanced domestic sourcing, what is at present a straightforward processing 
industry could develop into a more complicated value-added form of production, with 
stronger international competitiveness. Climbing up an industrial ladder toward more 
sophisticated skill-oriented production definitely requires improvements such as a more 
reliable infrastructure, stronger industrial linkages, and a more skilled labor force. If 
developments of that kind were to occur, CMP-based enclaves would lose their 
momentum, and Myanmar industrialists would have to leave them and seek resources 
nationwide. The success story of the CMP-based enclaves would come to an end, and 
businessmen would once again be confronted by the basics, or in other words by the 
need for Myanmar to get the fundamentals right. 
 
6. Conclusion: Getting the Fundamentals Right 
Still Stunted and Distorted by Structural Problems The industrial development of 
Myanmar has long been stunted and distorted by the economic policies followed by 
successive governments, including the present one. Even though the economy and 
industry underwent a preliminary phase of development in the first half of the 1990s as 
a result of an open door policy and liberalization measures, the brief period of growth 
failed to effect any real changes in the economic fundamentals and, even more 
importantly, failed to change the military government’s way of thinking on economic 
management. The industrial sector still suffers from poor power supplies, limited access 
to imported raw materials and machines, exchange rate instability, limited credit, 
frequent changes of government regulations and so forth. It is still plagued with a large 
number of serious structural problems. It has yet to break out of the past cycle of 
underdevelopment; and economic policies have continued to exert a stunting and 
distorting effect. 
Getting the Fundamentals Right Industrialization is neither an easy nor an 
automatic process. Moving up the production ladder to more capital- and skill-intensive 
products requires better facilities, a more reliable infrastructure, and more highly 
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trained workers and managers.48 To some extent, market forces push this process along, 
as is shown for example by the case of the Myanmar garment industry. Once proper 
incentives are given in markets, they can encourage entrepreneurs to enter into new 
industries. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no role for government to play in a 
market economy. There are actually many and important roles left for the government 
even in an economy with a free and open market. 
The role of government in a market economy, however, is not to construct 
state-owned factories in the hope of achieving rapid industrialization in leaps and 
bounds. On the contrary, what the government has to do first and foremost is to get the 
fundamentals right. Sound economic fundamentals may cover a wide range of factors 
and policy issues: examples are macroeconomic stability, a well-established 
infrastructure and financial institutions, well-trained human resources, a sound legal 
framework, and transparent and accountable governance of regulation and tax. In short, 
what the government has to do is to provide a better business climate and an efficient 
infrastructure in which private sector businesses, including foreign firms, can run their 
operations smoothly and vigorously. 
Second Time Bailout The issue here is whether the present government can do this 
or not. Since 1997, the pace of economic reforms has slackened virtually to a halt, 
leaving the transition to a market economy at the half-way stage, and failing to achieve 
a fundamental transformation of the economic system. In retrospect, it is now clear that 
the apparent policy changes of the late 1990s were made possible with windfall money 
from offshore natural gas exploitations. In fact, this would be the second bail-out of the 
Myanmar economy in an economic crisis. The first bail-out occurred in the mid-1970s, 
when the economy had already been on the verge of collapse. It was rescued by a 
massive infusion of economic aid and loans. The ODA money secured Ne Win in power, 
and at the time it enabled him to forgo much-needed economic reforms for sustainable 
development. 
What is the situation this time round? This time, the military government was 
bailed out of acute shortages of foreign exchange after 1997, when they had difficulty in 
buying petroleum even on long-term contracts. Revenues from natural gas must have 
considerably changed that situation. However, these revenues also pose a significant 
challenge for the government, namely how best to use the money. It is up to the 
                                                  
48 Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, Donald R. Snodgrass, Malcolm Gillis and Michael 
Roemer, Economics of Development, Fifth Edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 2001, p. 713. 
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government whether they use the money for much-needed economic reforms and 
infrastructure development, or whether they forgo these reforms. If the government 
regards the money as a windfall that can be poured into pet projects such as 
establishing a new industrial zone to accommodate many newly constructed state 
factories in a rural small town, the native place of the present leader, they will simply 
repeat the failure of the former leader once again. The government stands at the 
crossroads. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY ON PRIVATE FIRMS IN MYANMAR 
 
1. Objectives 
The IDE study team conducted a survey of private firms in Myanmar in 2003 with the 
aim of gaining an understanding of the current situation of the private sector and the 
business environment in Myanmar. The questionnaire was prepared and tested by the 
study team and the data collection was commissioned to a marketing and research 
company working under the supervision of IDE study team. 
 
2. Samples 
A total of 167 private firms were selected from Yangon and Mandalay. As regards 
Yangon, the sampling was based on the sector classification given by the Yangon 
Directory 2003. For Mandalay, we chose samples mainly from the manufacturing sector, 
Mandalay being famous as a production center in Myanmar. 
The sample firms were originally classified into 10 categories, namely exporters of 
garments, exporters of agricultural produce, exporters of marine products, 
manufacturers of agricultural produce, manufacturers of industrial products, 
manufacturers of consumer products, construction, services for businesses, services for 
consumers, and the retail trade. 
For the convenience of description and analysis in this paper, the author streamlined 
these ten categories into 3 sectors with 7 categories. The three sectors are 
manufacturing, construction and services. The manufacturing sector is further divided 
into four categories, namely garments, agricultural and marine products, industrial 
goods and consumer goods, while services are divided into the two groups of services for 
businesses such as software, advertising, and consultancy, and services for consumers 
such as restaurants and hotels. The numbers in each category are shown below. 
 
[Sector Classification of Samples] 
 Yangon Mandalay Total 
Garments 12 1 13 
Agri & Marine 18 2 20 
Industrial Goods 18 6 24 
Manufacturing 
Consumer Goods 41 22 63 
Construction 13 1 14 
For Businesses 15 0 15 
Services 
For Consumers 17 1 18 
Total 134 33 167 
   
3. Field Survey 
The field surveys were conducted by trained enumerators. The author of this paper 
joined the field surveys several times to get first-hand knowledge from interviews with 
the founders, owners and managers of private enterprises as well as to ensure that the 
surveys were of reasonable quality. The field surveys were conducted between October 
and December, 2003. 
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TABLES 
 
Number Growth(%)
FY 1990 27 -
FY 1991 23,848 883 times
FY 1992 25,081 5.2%
FY 1993 28,528 13.7%
FY 1994 31,540 10.6%
FY 1995 33,278 5.5%
FY 1996 35,348 6.2%
FY 1997 35,786 1.2%
FY 1998 35,915 0.4%
FY 1999 36,152 0.7%
FY 2000 37,649 4.1%
FY 2001 38,254 1.6%
FY 2002 39,604 3.5%
FY 2003 42,429 7.1%
FY 2004 43,435 2.4%
FY 2005* 41,875 -3.6%
(note) * as of May, 2005.
(Source) Ministry of Industry (1).
Table 2-1: Number of
Registered Private
Industrial Enterprises
 
 
 
Total
Number
Growth
(number)
FY 1985 597 -
FY 1990 616 19
FY 1995 708 92
FY 1996 753 45
FY 1997 771 18
FY 1998 802 31
FY 1999 824 22
FY 2000 848 24
FY 2001 901 53
FY 2002 1,132 231
(Source) CSO, Statistical Yearbook , 2003.
Table 2-2: Public Industrial
Enterprises
 
 
 
 i
Table 4-1: Infrastructure Access and Stocks         (%)
Water
Supply
access
Sanitation
access
Electricity
access
Telephone
access
Internet
access
Myanmar 72 64 5 1 0.1
Cambodia 44 22 17 4 0.2
Lao PDR 58 30 41 3 0.3
Vietnam 49 25 81 9 4.3
Thailand 93 98 84 50 11.1
China 76 39 99 42 6.3
(Source) ADB, Connecting East Asia , 2005, p. 9.
 
 
 
Table 4-2: Public Investment by Sector, Composition (%)
FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Agriculture 11.5 11.9 5.4 16.7 11.0 13.2 20.5 14.2
Livestock and Fishery 6.9 2.8 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Forestry 3.5 4.1 2.9 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.5
Mines 7.4 1.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Industry 36.1 17.7 4.8 0.9 1.7 2.3 2.3 5.7
Energy 5.3 22.0 8.0 3.4 4.8 6.7 4.8 6.6
Construction 3.6 6.0 9.5 12.1 11.9 20.5 15.7 20.3
Transport and Communications 12.6 12.7 12.3 15.4 17.4 16.6 15.4 15.0
Social Services 2.3 9.1 20.3 10.9 16.0 11.4 6.4 8.0
Finance 0.5 0.5 3.2 1.5 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.1
Trade 2.2 3.6 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.8
Defence 4.8 5.6 15.6 31.9 30.5 22.6 29.7 22.9
Administration 2.0 1.7 5.9 3.5 2.4 2.7 2.6 3.8
Development Committees 1.3 0.7 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Source) CSO, Statistical Yearbook , 2003.
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Table 4-3: SEEs' Capital Investment in Main Infrastructure Sectors, as of GDP (‰)
FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
ENERGY 25.1 5.4 2.3 3.5 4.1 2.4 2.5
   Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5
   Myanma Electric Power Enterprise 11.8 4.7 2.2 3.0 3.7 1.9 1.9
PUBLIC WORKS 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
TRANSPORT (WATER, AIR) 8.1 1.7 0.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 0.5
RAIL TRANSPORT 3.6 3.1 5.8 7.6 5.8 3.0 2.7
   Myanma Railways 2.6 2.9 5.7 7.5 5.6 2.9 2.6
   Road Transport 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, POST & TELEGRAPH 1.7 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6
INDUSTRY 19.6 3.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.4
   Industry(1) 15.8 3.0 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 1.0
   Industry(2) 3.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4
(Source) CSO, Statistical Yearbook , 2003.
 
 
 
 
Table 4-4: Performance Indexes for Infrastructure Development
FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 2000 FY 2002 FY1985→FY2002
FY1990→
FY2002
Electricity
Electric Power, Installed Capacity (MW) 684 804 982 1171 1190 1.7 1.5
Electric Power, Generation (Million KW) 2119 2643 3762 5118 5864 2.8 2.2
Electric Power, Consumption (Million KW) 1460 1675 2262 3268 4691 3.2 2.8
Transport
Railways: Passengers (in thousands) 55012 53180 53928 60486 61763 1.1 1.2
Railways: Freight (in ton miles) 271848 306861 551594 750040 723098 2.7 2.4
Airways: Passengers (in thousands) 466 416 637 448 500 1.1 1.2
Airways: Freight (in ton miles) 1209 688 482 705 435 0.4 0.6
Inland Waters: Passengers (in thousands) 20313 27481 24979 23270 24199 1.2 0.9
Inland Waters: Freight (in ton miles) 307535 325643 322601 344381 370872 1.2 1.1
Road: Passengers in Yangon (in thousands) 82994 97391 116703 37061 37879 0.5 0.4
Road: Freight (in ton miles) 157638 76842 147393 189893 208847 1.3 2.7
Arterial Highways (miles) 14417 14951 17299 17874 18112 1.3 1.2
Registered Motor Vehicles (number) 141015 178500 302833 442264 466708 3.3 2
Communications
Telephones (number) 59343 86333 169530 282853 351763 5.9 4.1
Mobile Phones (number) - - 5234 26960 94736 - -
e-mail subscribers (number) - - 289 (FY 1998
.6
) 3273 12706 - -
Internet users (number) - - - 40 7240 - -
Real GDP (Million Kyat, 1985 Prices) 55989.3 50259.5 66741.6 100274.8 135972.6 2.4 2.7
(Source) CSO, Statistical Yearbook , 2003.  
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Table 4-5: SEEs' Current Cash Budget (Kyat Million)
Industry ( (1)&(2) ) FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 4435 5491.4 6377.2 10691.4 13388 17660 24558.8 32387.7
Expenditures 4448.6 5129.4 5744 10907.8 12452.6 17522.6 27596.2 33269.6
Surplus/Deficit -13.6 362 633.2 -216.4 935.4 137.4 -3037.4 -881.9
  % of Receipts -0.3% 6.6% 9.9% -2.0% 7.0% 0.8% -12.4% -2.7%
MEPE FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 209.2 430.6 795.6 2771.1 3227.5 3450.8 3599.6 19680.8
Expenditures 201.9 412.3 658.5 2599.8 2721.6 3120.7 4976.9 20614.1
Surplus/Deficit 7.3 18.3 137.1 171.3 505.9 330.1 -1377.3 -933.3
  % of Receipts 3.5% 4.2% 17.2% 6.2% 15.7% 9.6% -38.3% -4.7%
Telecommunications,
Post and Telegraph FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 96.6 255.9 445.1 1834.5 2256.2 3401.7 4248 5168
Expenditures 65.7 130.9 316.9 1527.8 2066.6 2403.2 3558.9 4491.2
Surplus/Deficit 30.9 125 128.2 306.7 189.6 998.5 689.1 676.8
  % of Receipts 32.0% 48.8% 28.8% 16.7% 8.4% 29.4% 16.2% 13.1%
MPPE FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 393.9 795.6 1958.6 5070.2 4907.2 30142.6 48686.1 61705.6
Expenditures 519.1 808.8 2020.6 5139.3 5323.4 32988.5 55467.8 61289.5
Surplus/Deficit -125.2 -13.2 -62 -69.1 -416.2 -2845.9 -6781.7 416.1
  % of Receipts -31.8% -1.7% -3.2% -1.4% -8.5% -9.4% -13.9% 0.7%
Transport (5 SEEs:
Water&Air) FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 630.9 827.7 1111.8 2362.6 3202.1 3445.9 5455.3 5029.7
Expenditures 637.4 759.8 899.1 2006.9 2519.8 3759.6 5297.7 5482.3
Surplus/Deficit -6.5 67.9 212.7 355.7 682.3 -313.7 157.6 -452.6
  % of Receipts -1.0% 8.2% 19.1% 15.1% 21.3% -9.1% 2.9% -9.0%
Myanmar Railways FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 291.4 349.3 835.1 2065.4 2570.5 4237.7 5190.9 5250
Expenditures 283.8 304.3 672.3 1902.8 2066 3162.2 5414.7 5457.9
Surplus/Deficit 7.6 45 162.8 162.6 504.5 1075.5 -223.8 -207.9
  % of Receipts 2.6% 12.9% 19.5% 7.9% 19.6% 25.4% -4.3% -4.0%
Road Transport FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 173 214.9 349.1 711.7 663.5 1086.6 1265.2 1158
Expenditures 159.8 171.6 299.8 677.7 731.1 1197.6 1176.4 1148.6
Surplus/Deficit 13.2 43.3 49.3 34 -67.6 -111 88.8 9.4
  % of Receipts 7.6% 20.1% 14.1% 4.8% -10.2% -10.2% 7.0% 0.8%
Grand Total FY 1980 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
Receipts 17946.2 22335 31327.4 87185.1 108555 184921.2 242155.5 315141.7
Expenditures 18121.6 22503.3 32219.1 91624.6 119936.5 214639.7 309587.1 365695.2
Surplus/Deficit -175.4 -168.3 -891.7 -4439.5 -11381.5 -29718.5 -67431.6 -50553.5
  % of Receipts -1.0% -0.8% -2.8% -5.1% -10.5% -16.1% -27.8% -16.0%
(Source) CSO, Statistical Yearbook , 2003.
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Table 5-1: Major Importers of Myanmar Garment
(USD Millions)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004(MyanmarExports)*
EU (15 Countries) 94.1 118.0 155.1 276.1 348.8 307.2 339.9 456.8 144.2
　UK 31.9 26.0 35.0 80.8 97.3 98.6 102.6 139.0 45.6
　Germany 23.1 35.3 40.6 65.2 75.3 66.1 90.9 115.9 0.3
　France 29.2 33.8 51.4 57.6 70.6 61.7 52.3 62.9 14.7
　Spain 3.5 3.9 7.6 17.0 26.9 20.6 24.2 43.8 14.5
　Italy 4.1 5.2 4.1 13.1 19.2 20.7 21.6 33.2 9.3
　The Netherlands 5.7 6.8 10.7 29.6 35.1 9.8 15.3 26.0 2.5
Japan 1.1 2.3 2.1 4.6 7.5 15.0 32.2 44.8 27.0
Singapore 10.8 26.5 28.4 22.2 29.2 23.6 11.5
Canada 7.8 6.3 11.6 31.6 29.5 22.0 19.9 12.3 3.7
Korea 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 3.3 1.7 5.0 6.3 13.2
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.6 2.8 3.2 4.4
Australia 1.5 2.7 3.6 2.5 3.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 6.0
USA 85.3 127.8 185.7 403.5 408.0 298.6 232.7 0.0 0.2
Total (22 Countries) 189.8 257.2 369.1 745.5 829.0 668.5 661.8 547.3 225.8
(Note) The figures include HS61(Knit Apparel) and HS62 (Woven Apparel).
(Source) World Trade Atlas. Af for Myanmar Exports*, data is from Myanmar Customs.
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Table A-1: Year of Establishment
Garments
Agri &
Marine
Industrial
Goods
Consumer
Goods Sub-total
For
Business
For
Consumer
Up to 1988 1 2 3 18 24 0 0 3
1989 - 1992 0 7 7 13 27 8 4 2
1993 - 1996 2 5 6 12 25 5 5 4
1997 - 2000 8 4 7 18 37 2 6 7
2001 - 2003 2 2 1 1 6 0 0 2
Total 13 20 24 62 119 15 15 18 167
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Total
Manufacturing Services
Construction
27
41
39
52
8
 
 
 
Table A-2: Export
Yes No
Garments 11 2
Agri & Marine 16 4
Industrial Goods 4 20
Consumer Goods 10 53
1 13
For Business 1 14
For Consumer 0 18
43 124
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Total
Do you Export?
Manufac
turing
Services
Construction
 
 
 
Table A-3: Ethnicity of Entrepreneurs
Bamar Chinese Indian Otherindigenous Foreigners Total
Manufacturing 57 46 8 6 3 120
Construction 9 3 1 0 1 14
Services 22 7 3 1 0 33
Total 88 56 12 7 4 167
(Source) Survey, 2003.
 
 
Table A-4: Previous Occupation of Entrepreneurs
Bamar Chinese Indian Otherindigenous Foreigners Total
Public Sector 18 4 0 1 0 23
Private Sector 51 43 10 5 1 110
Overseas (incl. sailors) 8 4 2 1 2
Not working 11 5 0 0 1 17
Total 88 56 12 7 4 167
(Source) Survey, 2003.
17
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Table A-5: Ethnicity of Managers
Bamar Chinese Indian Total
Manufacturing 66 11 5 82
Construction 12 1 0 13
Services 27 2 1 30
Total 105 14 6 125
(Source) Survey, 2003.
 
Yes No
<20 34 15
20 - 49 32 7
50 - 99 30 4
100+ 42 3
Total 138 29
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Number
of
regular
Workers
Table A-6: Separation of
Business and Household
Do you separate
household expenditure
from business
expenditure?
 
 
Table A-7: Financial Documents
Do you have a ….? Yes No
Balance Sheet 136 31
Profit and Loss Statement 131 36
Annual Sales Plan 77 90
Annual Profit Plan 65 102
Financing Plan/Cash Flow 104 63
(Source) Survey, 2003.
 
 
Table A-8: Quality Standards
Yes No
Manufacturing 114 6
Services 23 10
Construction 13 1
Total 150 17
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Do you have own quality
standard?
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Table A-9: Cost Management
Yes No
<20 39 10
20 - 49 32 7
50 - 99 33 1
100+ 41 4
Total 145 22
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Number of
regular
Workers
Do you have own cost
management?
 
 
 
Table A-10: Technology Development
Company
staff
Team/Dep
artment
Owner/Fo
under Expatriate Total
Garments 10 1 1 1 13
Agri & Marine 9 3 3 0 15
Industrial Goods 9 2 13 0 24
Consumer Goods 15 4 38 0 57
Construction 4 4 1 1 10
For Business 6 1 6 0 13
For Consumer 3 0 6 0 9
Total 56 15 68 2 141
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Manufacturing
Services
 
 
 
Table A-11: Subcontractors
Yes No
Garments 4 9 13
Agri & Marine 1 19 20
Industrial Goods 5 19 24
Consumer Goods 7 56 63
1 13 14
For Business 0 15 15
For Consumer 1 17 18
19 148 167
(Source) Survey, 2003.
Do you have sub-
contractors? Total
Total
Manufac
turing
Services
Construction
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Table A-12: Rating of Problems
Big problem Problem No Problem
Domestic/local banking 47 53 67
Inadequate infrastructure 21 49 97
Frequent changes of systems and
insufficient information 20 58 89
Regulations/procedures for import 16 30 121
Foreign currency related problems 11 36 120
Non-disclosure of customs-related
information 11 34 122
Levies for domestic
transportation 8 35 124
Export Tax 6 13 148
Regulations on foreign currency
remittance 5 28 134
Regulations/procedures for export 4 20 143
International banking 4 10 153
Monopoly of state-owned
enterprises 3 17 147
Others 2 1 164
Total 158 384 1629
(Source) Survey, 2003.
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